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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the length of the grant lag under the early disclosure
system in Japan. First, we measure the length of the grant lag. Second, we investigate whether reducing
the grant lag significantly increases patent applications. We use data from 1985 to 2000 on 101 Japanese
companies. The parameter for the grant lag was significantly negative in all equations. Therefore, reducing
the grant lag increases patent applications. We also empirically investigated the determination of R&D. The
grant lag significantly affects R&D.?
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the length of the grant lag (the length of time between
the patent application and the granting of the patent (Johnson and Popp, 2003)) under the early disclosure
system in Japan. First, we measure the length of the grant lag. Second, we investigate whether reducing the
grant lag significantly increases patent applications.
Reducing the grant lag increases the international competitiveness of Japanese firms by increasing the num-
ber patents resulting from the stimulation of domestic research and development (R&D) under the early disclo-
sure system (Japan Patent Office,2007). Therefore, the policy of reducing the grant lag is an important patent
policy. In the US prior to December 2000, there was no early disclosure system and patent applications were
not published before patents are granted. Without an early disclosure system, the substance of the patent is
unknown before the granting of the patent. Furthermore, the grant lag is irrelevant because of the first-to-
invent rule. However, in the US, the grant lag for patents is increasingly assuming importance because of the
introduction of an early disclosure system.
There is little empirical work on the length of the grant lag. There are several theoretical studies of the
early disclosure system (Aoki and Prusa, 1996, Aoki and Spiegel,1998 and Bloch and Markowitz,1996). Aoki
and Prusa (1996) found that early disclosure reduces the quality of R&D. Aoki and Spiegel (1998) showed that
early disclosure reduces patent applications. Hence, we infer that reducing the grant lag would increase patent
applications because it corresponds to shortening disclosure.
In this paper, we show that reducing the grant lag increases patent applications. This happens because
patent protection is stronger after patents have been granted and, hence, grant lags reduce incentives to make
patent applications. Empirical work on patents in Japan is hampered by the lack of data on, for example, dates of
patent applications and grants, numbers of citations, and claims. However, data from the Institute of Intellectual
Property (IIP) are now available. The IIP patent data enable empirical study of patent policy.
Our paper is organized as follows. A description of the grant lag is presented in Section 2. Models, data,
and estimation methods are described in Section 3. Empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4.
Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
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2 The policy of reducing the grant lag
2.1 Japan
Recently, the Japan Patent Office employed several policies for the early determination of patent rights un-
der policies of intellectual property rights. Moreover, early determination of patent rights is one aim of the
”Strategic Council of Intellectual Property” of the Japanese Government. The Patent Law has been revised as
follows. The duration for objections after the granting of patents was determined in 1996 and periods of request
for substantive examinations were reduced in 2002. Furthermore, several improvement policies for examina-
tion efficiency, such as increasing the power of the examiner, specifying a duty of disclosure for prior art by
applicants, and introducing the outscoring of prior art search, have been used.
[ Figure 1]
The grant lag from 1985 to 2000 is shown in Figure 11. The grant lag for the drugs is short and that for the
electronics is long. In 1985, grant lags were similar between industries. For all industries, grant lags rose in the
late 1980s and suddenly fell in the early 1990s. Grant lags differed between industries in the late 1990s. Since
2000, the grant lag has been 2.5 years for all industries.
[ Figure 2]
The strength of patent protection in Japan is illustrated in Figure 2. Under the Japanese Patent Law, patent
applications must be disclosed after 18 months. After disclosure, compensation payments can be demanded.
Hence, the length of the period of examination does not affect the protection of the patent. However, the
right to demand compensation payment does not effectively protect patents. There are a number of reasons
for this. First, applicants cannot ask the courts for injunctions against third parties before patents are granted.
Second, demands for compensation for implementation before registration of the establishment of the patent
rights cannot be sustained when there are claim differences between application and grant. Third, applicants
face huge costs for litigation proceedings and suits.
Rights to suspend infringements, rights to precaution to infringements, and rights to demand compensation
for damages apply after registration of the establishment of the patent rights. Hence, patent protection is stronger
following registration of the establishment of the patent rights. Therefore, increasing grant lags discourages
patent applications.
1One can define the grant lag as the length of time between a request for substantive examination and the granting of a patent in Japan.
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2.2 The US
As in Japan and the EU, the US has introduced an early disclosure system. Twenty-six Nobel laureates opposed
its introduction in December 2000, arguing that early disclosure would reduce patent applications by elimi-
nating incentives among small businesses and private investors to undertake R&D (Johnson and Popp,2003).
When large firms infringe the patent rights of small-business and private inventors, it is not possible for the
holders of these patent rights to recover fully damages because of the huge legal costs. Furthermore, the exam-
ination periods for new inventions can become excessive. Hence, there is a greater risk of infringement for new
inventions (Johnson and Popp, 2003).
3 Empirical framework and data
3.1 The model
The purpose of this study is to test the effect of the length of grant lag on patent applications. We presume
that the number of patent applications is affected by the length of the grant lag. Furthermore, R&D investment,
sales, and dummy variables are incorporated into the estimation equation. Sales represent firm scale. Innovation
activity may be affected by firm size (Cohen ,1995 and Schumpeter ,1942).
P (i, t) = α0 + α1RD(i, t) + α2S(i, t) + α3GL(i, t) +
∑
βjD(j) + μ(i) + (i, t), (1)
In equation (1), P (i, t) denotes the number of patent applications at time t in firm i, RD(i, t) denotes real
R&D investment at time t in firm i, S(i, t) denotes sales at time t in firm i, GL(i, t) denotes the grant lag at
time t in firm i, and D(j) is a dummy variable for industry j. Four industry dummy variables are incorporated:
α0, α1,α2,α3,and βj are parameters, μ(i) denotes the unobservable firm effect, and (i, t) is the disturbance
term.
Our model is related to that of Griliches (1984). This equation is a general patent production function
(Griliches,1984 and Jaffe ,1986) except for the inclusion of the length of the grant lag. This equation is the
same as that used by Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), except that they do not include the length of the grant
lag.
Johnson and Popp (2003) assert that as scale decreases, the reaction against the length of the grant lag
strengthens. Hence, we incorporate an interaction term between the grant lag and sales into equation (1), as
follows:
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P (i, t) = α0 + α1RD(i, t) + α2S(i, t) + α3GL(i, t)
+ α4S(i, t)GL(i, t) +
∑
βjD(j) + μ(i) + (i, t), (2)
where S(i, t)GL(i, t) is the interaction term between the grant lag and sales. We expect the sign of the coef-
ficient on the interaction term to be positive. Furthermore, since 1988, more than one claim can be attached to a
patent application. This means that one patent application may correspond to more than one innovation. Hence,
to account for differences in claims, we construct another model in which the dependent variable represents
claim-weighted patent applications.
3.2 The grant lag
Generally, the average grant lag is as follows (Johnson and Popp,2003):
GL(t) =
∑
[g(t− i, t) × i] /
∑
g(t− i, t), (3)
where GL(t) denotes the average grant lag at time t and g(t − i, t) denotes the number of patent grants
at time t that is applied at time t − i2. However, the grant lag, as represented by equation (3), depends on
the number of patent applications. This is because the number of patent grants depends on the number of
patent applications. If patent applications are high, so are patent grants. Thus, the definition of the grant lag
represented by equation (3), as proposed by Johnson and Popp (2003), is not ideal. Hence, we amend the
equation for the average grant lag as follows:
GL(t) =
∑ [g(t− i, t) × i]
a(t− i) /
∑ g(t− i, t)
a(t− i) , (4)
where a(t − i) denotes the number of patent applications at time t − i. In equation (4), the average grant
lag is not affected by the number of patent applications; its effect is cancelled. We suggest that equation (4) is
an appropriate representation of the grant lag3.
[ Table 1]
[ Table 2]
2Equation (3) for the grant lag is not explicitly described by Johnson and Popp (2003). However, we base equation (3) on their study.
3We use data on the number of requests for substantive examination rather than data on patent applications.
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The data on patents are from the IIP database. We use data from 1985 to 2000 on 101 Japanese companies in
the drugs, chemicals, electronics, precision instruments, and transportation equipment. The number of requests
for substantive examination and the number of patent grants are shown in Table 1. In the drugs, the ratio of
patent grants to patent applications is high at 46%, and well above the industry mean of 26%.
Data on investment in R&D, Tobin’s q and sales are obtained from the NEEDS database (Tokyo: Ni-
hon Keizai Shimbunsya). The deflators used for R&D and output are from the Japan Industrial Productivity
Database published by the Research Institute of the Economy, Trade and Industry. Details of the data used for
Tobin’s q are provided by Nakanishi and Yamada (2007). Basic statistics on our variables are shown in Table 2.
4 Results
4.1 Patent applications
[ Table 3]
The estimation results for the patent applications function are shown in Table 3. The parameter for the grant
lag is significantly negative in all equations that exclude the interaction term between the grant lag and sales.
Therefore, reducing the grant lag increases patent applications. The parameter for the interaction term between
the grant lag and sales is significantly positive in all equations that include this interaction term. Therefore, the
impact of reducing the grant lag strengthens as scale decreases. Both the parameter for the grant lag and that for
the interaction term between the grant lag and sales are significantly positive at the 10% level in all equations
that include the interaction term between the grant lag and sales. The R&D parameters are all significantly
positive. The sales parameters are positeve and significant in column (3) and (4). Therefore, the grant lag
significantly affects patent applications.
Equations (1) and (2) are static and do not control for potential endogeneity. Therefore, we used the gener-
alized method of moments (GMM) on the following first-differenced version of equation (2) that includes the
lagged dependent variable:
DP (i, t) = γ DP (i, t− 1) + α1DRD(i, t) + α2DS(i, t)
+ α3DGL(i, t) + α4D(S(i, t)GL(i, t)) + (i, t), (5)
where D denotes the first-difference operator and γ is parameter.
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[ Table 4]
The GMM estimation results for patent applications are shown in Table 4. The parameters of all terms
related to the grant lag are significantly negative. Moreover, the parameters for the interaction terms between
the grant lag and sales are all significantly positive. The R&D parameters are all significantly positive. Although
all the sales parameters are significant, the one in column (7) is positive. Therefore, the grant lag significantly
affects patent applications. GMM estimation improves the results4.
To account for patent citations, we classify patent applications into two types: (1) patent applications already
cited; and (2) patent applications not previously cited(Trajtenberg ,1990, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg ,2001, and
Nakanishi and Yamada ,2007).
[ Table 5]
The estimation results that incorporate the citation effect are shown in Table 5. The parameter for the grant
lag is significantly negative in the regression for the number of applications cited. However, the parameter
for the grant lag is not significantly negative in the regression for the number of applications not cited. The
parameters for the other variables are significant in all models. Hence, the grant lag does not significantly affect
patent applications without citation.
[ Table 6]
We used the GMM estimator to estimate first-differenced versions of the equations for cited and noncited
patents that include the lagged dependent variable. The GMM estimation results that incorporate the citation
effect are shown in Table 6. The parameter for the grant lag is significantly negative in the regression for the
number of applications cited. However, the parameter for the grant lag is negative but not significant in the
regression for patent applications not cited. The parameters of all variables except sales are significant in all
models. These estimates are similar to the panel estimates. Therefore, our results are robust. They confirm that
the grant lag does not significantly affect patent applications without citation.
4.2 R&D
We also empirically investigated the determination of R&D. The policy relating to the grant lag is a patent
policy and therefore patent applications are affected by this patent policy. Essentially, the patent is the output
4The instrument set includes all lagged variables.
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that is produced according to the patent production function. In particular, R&D is the most important factor in
the patent production function. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that R&D is stimulated by the length of the
grant lag. Therefore, we must also investigate the determination of R&D empirically. The main R&D equation
is
RD(i, t) = α0 +α1q(i, t) + α2S(i, t)
+ α3GL(i, t) + α4S(i, t)GL(i, t) + μ(i) + (i, t). (6)
Furthermore, the high propensity to patent means that patents are valued and so we incorporate the propen-
sity to patent. If the propensity to patent is high, the impact of the grant lag is strong. An interaction term
between the propensity to patent and the grant lag is included in our model. Interaction terms between the
propensity to patent, sales, and the grant lag are also included in our model. We expect the sign of the inter-
action term between the propensity to patent and the grant lag to be negative. We estimate the following R&D
equation:
RD(i, t) = α0 +α1q(i, t) + α2S(i, t)
+ α5PT (i)GL(i, t) + α6S(i, t)PT (i)GL(i, t) + μ(i) + (i, t), (7)
where PT (i) is firm i’s propensity to patent (Sakakibara and Branstetter,2001), and q(i, t) denotes Tobin’s q
at time t in firm i. This model is identical to that of Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), except for our inclusion
of the grant lag.
[ Table 7]
The estimation results for R&D determination are shown in Table 7. The parameter of the grant lag is
significantly negative in all models except the one reported in column (13). The sales parameter is significant in
all equations. However, the parameter on Tobin’s q is not significant. Hence, the grant lag significantly affects
R&D. Furthermore, the effects of scale, the propensity to patent, and the grant lag are confirmed empirically.
[ Table 8]
Equation (6) has no dynamics and ignores endogeneity. Therefore, we used the GMM estimator to estimate
a first-differenced version of equation (6) that includes the lagged dependent variable. The GMM estimation
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results for R&D are shown in Table 8. The parameter for the grant lag is significantly negative. The sales
parameter is significant in all equations. However, the parameter for Tobin’s q is not significant. The estimation
results in Table 8 are similar to those in Table 7. Hence, the grant lag affects R&D.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we showed that reducing the grant lag increases patent applications. Having measured the length
of the grant lag, we investigated whether reducing the grant lag contributed significantly to increasing patent
applications. The parameter for the grant lag was significantly negative in all equations that excluded the inter-
action term between the grant lag and sales. Therefore, reducing the grant lag increases patent applications. The
parameter for the interaction term between the grant lag and sales was significantly positive in all equations that
included this interaction term. Therefore, the impact of reducing the grant lag strengthens as scale decreases.
We used the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to estimate first-differenced versions of the
equations that included lagged dependent variables. GMM improved the estimation results.
To account for patent citations, we classified patent applications into two types. The parameter for the grant
lag was significantly negative in the regression for the number of applications cited. However, the parameter
for the grant lag was not significantly negative in the regression for the number of applications not cited.
We also empirically investigated the determination of R&D. We also incorporated the propensity to patent.
The parameter of the grant lag was significantly negative in most models. Hence, the grant lag significantly
affects R&D. Furthermore, the effects of scale, the propensity to patent, and the grant lag were confirmed
empirically.
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Figure 1: Grant Lag
12
Figure 2: Patent Protection
13
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Patents
Sector Number of Applications Requests Grants Request / Grants / Grants /
Firms Applications Requests Applications
Drugs 11 14366 8039 6633 0.56 0.83 0.46
Chemicals 34 333173 140522 91254 0.42 0.65 0.27
Precision 34 1737427 813280 433652 0.47 0.53 0.25
Instruments
Transportation 7 86535 29438 15629 0.34 0.53 0.18
Equipment
Electronics 15 230835 117451 72839 0.51 0.62 0.32
Total 101 2402336 1108730 620007 0.46 0.56 0.26
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Sample Firms Observations
variable Mean Max. Min. SD
Applications 1547 19900 13 2883
Claim− weighted Applications 6378 143245 43 14634
R&D(YM) 31599 423878 18 60522
Sales(YM) 572170 7669141 12214 861889
Grant Lag(year) 3.60 10.57 2.45 0.71
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Table 3: Patent Applications and Grant Lag
Dependent Variable Applications Claim-weighted Applications
fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 4.26 6.31 -11.1 -7.94
(0.55) (1.60) (0.82) (2.50)
R&D 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.16
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Sales -0.02 -0.19 1.25 1.00
(0.05) (0.13) (0.08) (0.20)
Grant Lag -0.27 -1.82 -0.29 -2.76
(0.11) (1.15) (0.17) (1.82)
Grant Lag × Sales 0.13 0.20
(0.09) (0.15)
D(Drugs = 1) 2.31 2.32 0.46 0.46
(0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.21)
D(Chemicals = 1) 1.30 1.25 3.04 2.98
(0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.22)
D(Electronics = 1) 1.00 0.98 2.96 2.93
(0.16) (0.16) (0.26) (0.26)
D(Precision 1.79 1.78 0.95 0.94
Instruments = 1) (0.15) (0.15) (0.24) (0.24)
Samples 1083 1083 1215 1215
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4: Patent Applications and Grant Lag
Dependent Variable Applications Claim-weighted Applications
GMM GMM GMM GMM
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Applicationt−1 0.606 0.612
(0.004) (0.004)
Claim− weightedApplicationst−1 0.886 0.886
(0.003) (0.004)
R&Dt 0.076 0.075 0.077 0.073
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Salest -0.126 -0.222 0.037 -0.355
(0.014) (0.029) (0.006) (0.042)
Grant Lagt -0.337 -1.261 -0.106 -3.842
(0.017) (0.308) (0.013) (0.266)
Grant Lagt × Salest 0.073 0.298
(0.024) (0.022)
P − value 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.44
Samples 1102 1102 1102 1102
Note: All variables in first differences; Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5: Patent Applications and Grant Lag
Dependent Variable Claim-weighted Applications
fixed effect fixed effect
with cited without cited
(9) (10)
Constant -4.05 -14.02
(0.97) (1.28)
R&D 0.24 0.18
(0.06) (0.08)
Sales 0.52 1.38
(0.10) (0.13)
Grant Lag -0.57 0.24
(0.19) (0.25)
D(Chemicals = 1) 1.74 0.13
(0.22) (0.29)
D(Electronics = 1) 2.88 3.27
(0.23) (0.31)
D(Precision 2.50 3.53
Instruments = 1) (0.38) (0.50)
D(Transportation 1.88 1.05
Equipment = 1) (0.27) (0.36)
Samples 807 807
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6: Patent Applications and Grant Lag
Dependent Variable Claim-weighted Applications
GMM GMM
with cited without cited
(11) (12)
Claim− weightedApplicationst−1 0.51 0.93
(0.002) (0.001)
R&Dt 0.25 0.19
(0.005) (0.008)
Salest -0.03 0.02
(0.008) (0.011)
Grant Lagt -1.42 0.01
(0.024) (0.013)
p− value 0.37 0.49
Samples 665 665
Note: All variables in first differences; Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7: R&D and Grant Lag
Dependent Variable R&D
fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect
without Propensity to Patent with Propensity to Patent
(13) (14) (15)
Constant -2.73 -0.10 1.16
(0.47) (1.44) (1.25)
q -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Sales 1.03 0.82 0.71
(0.03) (0.11) (0.10)
Grant Lag 0.05 -1.98
(0.10) (1.05)
Grant Lag × Sales 0.16
(0.09)
Grant Lag × -7.78
Propensity to Patent (2.34)
Grant Lag × Sales × 0.64
Propensity to Patent (0.19)
D(Chemicals = 1) -1.05 -1.04 -1.06
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
D(Electronics = 1) -0.73 -0.77 -0.74
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
D(Precision -1.46 -1.46 -1.39
Instruments = 1) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
D(Transportation -2.92 -2.92 -2.76
Equipment = 1) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14)
Samples 1261 1261 1261
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8: R&D and Grant Lag
Dependent Variable R&D
GMM
(16)
R&Dt−1 0.029
(0.029)
qt−1 0.001
(0.017)
Salest−1 0.384
(0.203)
Grant Lag × -13.517
Propensity to Patent (4.723)
Grant Lag × Sales × 1.045
Propensity to Patent (0.370)
p− value 0.036
Samples 1100.00
Note: All variabless in first differences; Standard errors in parentheses.
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